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This article discusses the deadlock in the WTO on multilateral harmonization of non-
preferential rules of origin (RoO) and reviews some of the RoO included in recent 
preferential trade agreements. We argue that there is a trend towards adoption of similar 
approaches and that this suggests that cooperation to reduce the trade-impeding effects 
of differences in RoO across jurisdictions is more feasible than often is assumed by observers 
and policymakers. From a trade facilitation perspective such cooperation could be based 
on plurilateral initiatives under the umbrella of the WTO. These could include a focus on 
pursuit of greater convergence between preferential and nonpreferential RoO helping to 
achieve the long-standing goal of moving towards harmonization of rules of origin. 
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Trade agreements require the parties to agree on the rules (regulations) that will 
determine whether a product is eligible to benefit from whatever provisions are 
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embodied in the agreement. Thus, to be eligible for preferential market access 
benefits an exporter must document that a good has been produced in an eligible 
country. Such preferential rules of origin (RoO) have been the focus of much research, 
lobbying and policy debate.1 To a significant extent the more difficult it is for 
exporters to satisfy RoO – the more restrictive or stringent the RoO are – the less 
valuable preferential access will be. Less well-known and studied are non-preferential 
RoO. These are needed to determine whether a product is subject to a nation’s trade 
policy. For example, if the EU imposes an antidumping measure on imports of a 
product originating in China, there is need to determine the origin of that product to 
avoid possible circumvention.2 The same is true when it comes to access to government 
procurement markets: if India opens up access to public procurement contracts to 
firms from China, it will be necessary to determine whether goods are eligible – 
i.e., what constitutes a Chinese product. More generally, all countries regulate what 
constitutes the origin of a product (so-called marks of origin or country of origin 
labelling) for consumer information reasons, to be able to implement health and 
safety-related regulations, for statistical purposes, and so forth. 
RoO are distinct from other regulatory policies such as product standards in that 
compliance is not a necessary condition for being able to export (sell) a product. 
In the case of preferential trade arrangements, a RoO is equivalent to a conditional 
tax: if the RoO is not satisfied an importer must pay the relevant MFN tariff. In the 
case of a product subject to other types of trade policy – e.g., if there are antidumping 
duty measures in place – a determination of origin is required to establish whether 
the antidumping duty applies. In all these cases the RoO does not act to prohibit or 
prevent a product from entering the market, as can be case for other types of policy 
– for example, if mandatory health and safety-related product standards are not 
satisfied. That said, different types of RoO and the specific criteria that apply will 
 
1 See e.g., Anliker (2016), Soprano (2016), Cadot et al. (2006) or Conconi et al. (2016). 
2 In practice the link with trade defence mechanisms like antidumping is addressed in major jurisdictions 
such as the US and EU through special anti-circumvention measures. See Inama, Vermulst and 
Eeckhout (2009). 
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have a differential impact on the cost of production and thus the probability that 
an exporter will choose (or be forced) to pay the applicable MFN tariff.  
The most commonly used approaches to determine the origin of products are 
based on whether a manufacturing or other processing operation results in: (i) an 
ad valorem percentage calculated according to different approaches;3 (ii) a change 
in tariff heading, i.e., how a product is classified in the Harmonized Commodity 
Description and Coding System (the Harmonized System or HS), the tariff classification 
nomenclature used by WTO members; or (iii) involves the use of a specific technology, 
method or process. A recent trend is the adoption of an upper bound on the amount 
or share of imported (non-originating) physical materials that may be embodied in 
a product. The latter is easier for firms to understand and to comply with than value 
added based criteria, and has been advocated by low-income countries in the 
context of non-reciprocal preferential market access programs implemented by 
OECD nations and emerging economies (Inama, 2011). 
Differences in specific RoO across products that are applied by importing countries 
increase the complexity of trade policy for businesses, generate trade costs and may 
affect investment and sourcing decisions in ways that reduce efficiency. Moreover, 
differences between countries in the RoO for the same product further increases 
complexity for traders that sell to multiple markets. Differences across RoO regimes 
maintained by importing countries create costs for firms as they imply that firms 
seeking to benefit from preferential access regimes must ensure that their production 
processes are tailored so as to satisfy the RoO regime prevailing in each market 
they sell to. Such additional cost effects also arise in the case for non-preferential 
RoO: differences across countries, both in terms of substantive requirements and 
in terms of labelling, will imply specific fixed costs of exporting to different markets. 
Thus, RoO may act as nontariff barriers for any given market, and differences in 
RoO across markets can have analogous effects to differences in the regulatory 
requirements that apply to a product in different countries. Reducing such heterogeneity 
is a potential way to reduce the costs associated with RoO. As discussed below, this 
 
3 Such approaches may be summarized as (i) whether a minimum share of the value added embodied 
in a product was the result of activities in the last country in which the product was processed 
according to different calculation techniques or (ii) a given percentage of non-originating materials 
has not been exceeded or a minimum percentage of originating inputs has been used in the manufacturing 
of the finished product. 
6 Bernard Hoekman and Stefano Inama 
ⓒ Korea Institute for International Economic Policy 
has long been on the multilateral trade policy agenda, but only for non-preferential 
RoO. The reason is that preferential RoO are argued to fall outside the ambit of the 
WTO because (i) non-reciprocal trade preferences are granted at the discretion of 
importing countries; and (ii) in the case of discriminatory preferential trade agreements 
(PTAs) there is a tacit consensus that WTO members should be free to define their 
own RoO to determine if a product is eligible for the tariff preference – i.e., there 
is acceptance of policy space for this dimension of the implementation of PTAs.4 
Economic research on RoO has largely focused on estimating their trade-distorting 
effects, often using methodologies that are centred on estimating the ad valorem 
tariff equivalents of RoO5 or classifying RoO into types and constructing indexes 
in order to assess the relative restrictiveness of RoO across countries and trade 
agreements.6 While such efforts are important in determining how RoO can (and 
do) act as nontariff barriers to trade, this type of research is not particularly useful 
in informing efforts by governments seeking to cooperate on RoO to facilitate trade. 
Such efforts require detailed analysis of the specific RoO adopted by different 
countries or trade blocs, their evolution over time, and an understanding of where 
governments have adopted rules that are similar or equivalent. 
In what follows we first briefly review in Section 1 the state of play in the WTO 
with respect to efforts to harmonize nonpreferential RoO. Section 2 discusses 
developments regarding RoO in recent PTAs. Section 3 presents some preliminary 
evidence regarding the extent of regulatory heterogeneity in the area of preferential 
RoO. This suggests that many of the preferential RoO adopted in recent PTAs are 
not very dissimilar from the draft harmonized non-preferential RoO that emerged 
from WTO deliberations. While significant differences in RoO remain across products 
and countries, there appears to be a trend towards greater convergence. Section 4 
makes some proposals for moving forward in reducing the costs of regulatory 
heterogeneity in this policy area on a plurilateral basis, given a presumption that 
the prospects for full harmonization of either nonpreferential or preferential RoO 
will remain limited. Section 5 concludes. 
 
4 See, e.g., Keizer (1997) and Inama (2009). 
5 See, e.g., Cadot and Ing (2016), Cadot, Carrere, de Melo and Tumurchudur (2006) and Conconi et 
al. (2016). 
6 Estevadeordal et al. (2009). 
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II. WTO RULES AND NEGOTIATIONS ON HARMONIZATION OF  
NONPREFERENTIAL RoO  
 
The GATT left importing nations free to define what criteria or conditions they 
apply to determine the origin of a product as long as these are applied on a most-
favoured-nation basis. The same applies to preferential access programs for developing 
countries: these may not discriminate across eligible developing exporting countries.7 
However, there have been efforts over time to establish greater multilateral discipline 
on RoO. These culminated in the Uruguay round Agreement on Rules of Origin 
(ARO), one of the multilateral agreements that is overseen by the WTO. The ARO 
requires that non-preferential RoO be applied in non-discriminatory manner, are 
transparent, are not designed to be a barrier to trade, and are administered in a 
consistent, uniform, impartial, and reasonable manner. It does not impose substantive 
obligations on the content or design of RoO. The ARO set the ambitious objective 
of the adoption of a single set of nonpreferential rules of origin “equally for all 
purposes”8 to avoid a situation where RoO may vary across products and may even 
vary for a given product depending on the type of trade policy instrument they apply 
to. In practice, a country may use more restrictive RoO for antidumping actions than 
it does, for example, to trade in the same product(s) that occurs under the umbrella 
of a mutual recognition agreement pertaining to applicable technical standards. 
 
7 Mavroidis (2016). RoO are an important dimension of free trade agreements, but the GATT/WTO 
does not impose any rules on the RoO that signatories of such agreements apply notwithstanding 
the general recognition that such RoO are not just a matter of concern to participating countries but 
can affect third parties. For example, in the context of the 1972 FTA between the EEC and EFTA 
States, the US argued that the rules of origin would generate ‘…trade diversion by raising barriers 
to third countries’ exports of intermediate manufactured products and raw materials. This resulted 
from unnecessarily high requirements for value originating within the area. In certain cases the 
rules disqualify goods with value originating within the area as high as 96 percent. The rules of 
origin limited non-originating components to just five percent of the value of a finished product of 
the same tariff heading [for] nearly one-fifth of all industrial tariff headings. In many other cases a 
20 percent rule applied’ (GATT, 1974:152-153 cited in Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009).   
8 See Article 9 (1) (a) of the Agreement on Rules of Origin (ARO). 
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In addition to the goal of using the same RoO for all purposes, the most important 
objective of the ARO is to work towards the harmonization of non-preferential RoO 
(Art. 9) across countries. This has been pursued through a Harmonization Work 
Programme (HWP) managed by the WTO Committee on Rules of Origin, and primarily 
executed by a Technical Committee that involves the active participation of the 
World Customs Organization (WCO). The ARO provides for the development a set 
of nonpreferential harmonized RoO based on the change of tariff classification (using 
the Harmonized System) as the preferred method to define substantial transformation.9 
In cases where the HS nomenclature does not allow substantial transformation to 
be determined by a change in tariff classification test, the Technical Committee 
was to consider the use of supplementary tests such as value added criteria or agree 
on ‘specific manufacturing processes’ that if used confer origin (i.e., imply sufficient 
transformation of a product has occurred). 
The HWP was supposed to be completed in July 1998. Results of the technical 
review undertaken by the WCO were submitted to the WTO by a revised deadline 
of November 1999. As of today, however, the HWP and the associated draft text 
has yet to be completed by the WTO Committee on Rules of Origin (CRO). Despite 
considerable progress, as witnessed by the development of a draft text, a final 
consensus could not be obtained. This reflects opposition of some WTO members, 
notably the United States, to the implications of the results of the HWP for different 
WTO agreements. The main reason for concern by these countries is that adoption 
of harmonized nonpreferential RoO across would affect (constrain) the discretion 
of government agencies in implementing specific trade policies – such as antidumping 
measures. This so-called “implications issue” led to the cessation of formal negotiations 
in the mid-2000s.10 
Discussions in the WTO since 2007 have been limited to updating the draft HWP 
text on Harmonized Rules of Origin to reflect new versions of the Harmonized 
 
9 See ARO, Article 9 (1) (c) ii. 
10 Since then another “implication” of harmonization has been highlighted by China, which has been 
a proponent of harmonization of non-preferential RoO as a means of improving the measurement 
of trade balances by better accounting where value is added in the production of goods (i.e., to 
reflect the fact that many of the goods that are counted as Chinese in the import statistics of trading 
partners are not of Chinese origin since most of the value embodied in them is associated with 
inputs originating in third countries).  
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System and informal workshops on the consequences of the absence of harmonised 
RoO for business. In 2016 Switzerland initiated informal consultations among WTO 
members on a limited negotiating agenda aiming at making progress by focusing 
on areas where pragmatic approaches could be taken to facilitate trade in the absence 
of full harmonization of non-preferential RoO. This initiative was inspired by the 
successful format of the Nairobi Ministerial Decision on preferential rules of origin 
for LDCs. The Swiss proposals centred on two specific dimensions: “transparency” 
and “certification” (Delegation of Switzerland, 2016). The former has to do with the 
fact that most notifications made to the WTO are either out of date and/or incomplete. 
A proposed initiative on the latter seeks to reduce or remove the need for certificates 
of nonpreferential origin, which are argued to constitute redundant red tape and a 
needless cost to business. We return to the potential for greater pursuit of such pragmatic 
approaches in Section 5. 
In the case of preferential RoO there have been a number of developments since 
the late 1990s. One concerns implementation of unilateral preferential programs. 
Starting in 2005, developed countries committed to facilitate exports of the least-
developed countries (LDCs) by providing these nations with duty-free, quota-free 
(DFQF) access for at least 97 percent of product lines. A number of OECD countries, 
including the EU, have implemented programs that provide DFQF access to all 
products except arms. This gave rise to discussion in the WTO on RoO, with the 
LDCs arguing that strict RoO substantially reduced the value of DFQF access. As 
a result there have been deliberations and some progress in agreeing to adopt RoO 
that are simpler and easier to satisfy. The pursuit of incremental convergence in 
the RoO that apply for LDCs has complemented the long-running effort to agree 
to harmonize RoO for non-preferential trade policy purposes. 
 
III. RoO IN RECENT PTAs 
 
Despite the stalemate on non-preferential RoO, negotiations on preferential RoO 
have thrived as a result of negotiation of new PTAs and efforts by developing countries 
to enhance the economic salience of non-reciprocal preferential market access 
programs. A basic tenet (the conventional wisdom) of most RoO experts and trade 
officials is that there are no possible spillovers among preferential and non-preferential 
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RoO, since they serve different trade policy objectives. Preferential RoO serve to 
determine whether a preferential tariff is applicable under a RTA or a unilateral 
arrangement, while non-preferential RoO serve to determine the application of most-
favoured nation (MFN) trade policies and specific WTO agreements. 
Recent research on private industry experience and views on dealing with RoO 
reveals that this distinction is not very important for firms. For many firms compliance 
with rules of origin is a normal part of a business transaction that has a cost. The 
main difference between preferential and non-preferential RoO is that the former 
are associated with an expected benefit of reduced duty or duty free entry in the 
export market, but in many cases companies are obliged to comply with RoO in 
any event. A recent survey (Anliker, 2016) revealed a 100 percent awareness by 
respondent companies of non-preferential RoO, with some 55 percent of firms 
perceiving non-preferential rules to be relevant to their daily operations. Reasons 
for this included such RoO being demanded by clients, by importing country Customs 
authorities and/or financial service providers (e.g., for letters of credit). This helps 
to explain why large companies are prepared to incur the cost of buying and maintaining 
sophisticated IT systems and related personnel to be able to more efficiently assure 
compliance with RoO – both preferential and non-preferential (Soprano, 2016). 
Smaller companies are generally less aware and less able to assess the importance 
of RoO in their day to day business. Most companies favour harmonizing RoO as 
a measure to facilitate trade and bring down cost of compliance, with a clear preference 
for greater acceptance and use of self-declaration of origin by firms as opposed to 
having to use certificates of origin issued by certifying authorities or Chambers of 
Commerce (the latter generally give rise to fees associated with obtaining such 
certification). 
There has been considerable evolution in the technique and content of drafting 
RoO in PTAs. South-South agreements — e.g., the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC); the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) — traditionally adopted a simple formula, such as an across-the-
board percentage criterion mirroring the percentage rules in the US Generalized 
System of Preferences (GSP) scheme (Inama, 2011). In addition they often adopted 
as an alternative a change of tariff heading criterion following the EU model. In short, 
these PTAs have not developed their own RoO model. Over time they developed 
product specific rules of origin (PSRO), but again borrowing the drafting techniques 
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from the existing US and EU models. This is the case for Asian trading nations – 
Japan, South Korea, the ASEAN countries – as well, which have borrowed heavily 
from the North American model for RoO (Inama and Sim, 2015). 
In practice the method for calculating the ad valorem percentage criterion in 
most Asian PTAs is very similar to the method adopted in the PTAs that were 
concluded by the US subsequent to adoption of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA). Asian countries have also largely adopted the change of tariff 
classification criterion as the preferred method for defining product-specific rules 
of origin in their PTAs, in a similar vein to the NAFTA model. ASEAN countries for a 
long time pursued a policy to determine their own version of the ad valorem percentage 
criterion and defining product-specific RoO. This changed following the negotiation 
of PTAs with Australia and New Zealand, which had adopted the North American 
model in their PTAs with US. The latest iteration of ASEAN rules of origin in the 
ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (ATIGA) demonstrates the domino effect of 
the North American model: the calculation of ad valorem percentage criteria is similar 
to the NAFTA model and the product-specific RoO are based on a default change 
in tariff classification as an alternative to the traditional 40% ad valorem percentage. 
The earlier ASEAN rules of origin were the basis of agreement in the initial PTAs 
between ASEAN and China in the mid-2000s, but more recent PTAs such as the 
China -South Korea agreement have adopted RoO that are inspired by the North 
American model. In short, Asian countries mostly have tended to follow the basic 
NAFTA approach towards RoO. This “revealed preference” was also illustrated in 
the final text of 2016 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), with a set of RoO that 
largely draw on the North American model.11 
Despite the often claimed rigid separation between non-preferential and preferential 
RoO, the border between the two regimes has always been porous. NAFTA had a 
major influence on the WTO ARO. It was US insistence that resulted in the change 
of tariff classification (CTC) becoming the preferred methodology for drafting rules 
for non-preferential RoO – as opposed to the EU approach of using a combination of 
 
11 Although the US ended up withdrawing from the TPP, Canada and Mexico are also signatories to 
the TPP and are members of the subsequent effort by the remaining 11 signatory countries to implement 
most of what was agreed under the umbrella of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement 
on Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). In this paper we focus on the ROO included in the original TPP.  
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criteria – the CTC, percentage criterion and specific working and processing requirements. 
By itself this could be interpreted as a first sign of convergence, even though there 
are different modalities across PTAs in drafting RoO according to the CTC criterion. 
This primacy of the CTC over other methodologies for determining substantial 
transformation gave rise to discussions during the initial phases of the HWP negotiations 
between the EU and NAFTA partners in the Technical Committee on Rules of Origin 
(TCRO) and later in the WTO CRO. The 1996-99 TCRO negotiation on non-preferential 
RoO was the first time the EU and the US confronted each other on this matter. 
Before that time the EU had for some 20-plus years been dealing with RoO in the 
context of its PTAs with European Free Trade Association (EFTA) members and 
the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries. All these countries were confronted 
with the then newly matured experience of the US and its partners obtained in negotiating 
the Canada-US Trade Agreement (CUSTA) and the NAFTA. 
While negotiators in the TCRO argued that preferential RoO did not have a 
bearing on the HWP discussions, it was clear, as demonstrated by the dynamics of 
the negotiations, that the discussions on non-preferential RoO started from their 
respective national/regional preferential RoO backgrounds and experience, at least 
at the technical level. In other words, each “bloc” proposed and defended its own 
model of RoO. The eventual draft text that emerged from the HWP largely reflected 
a compromise between the EU and NAFTA models, with a number of innovations 
and some disagreement on specific sectors, like machinery.12 In retrospect, the 1999 
draft harmonized rules of origin (HRO) text represents a tangible sign of convergence 
that, even if not adopted, influenced the way RoO were negotiated in subsequent 
PTAs. An example is the progressive acceptance of the use of the wholly obtained 
criterion as a requirement for the list of product-specific rules (a typical EU feature) 
included in the EU-Mexico agreement and later in the Canada-EU Comprehensive 
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA). Another example is the use of chemical 
reactions, a concept inherited from the HWP work, as a specific requirement for 
some chemical products given the inherent technical difficulty of determining the 
 
12 The “machinery package” allowed each member to choose either a “change of tariff classification 
rule” (the preferred US method for origin determination) or a “value-added rule” (the preferred EU 
method for determining origin in this specific sector and circumstance.12 This is the so-called dual-
rule approach. See WTO document JOB(07)/73). 
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corresponding CTC for chemical products. Some of these areas of convergence were 
later reflected in the RoO included in trade agreements that Asian countries negotiated 
with the EU and US, and, more recently, the RoO that apply in trade agreements 
negotiated among Asian countries.  
Despite the HWP coming to a standstill in 2007, the many PTAs that have been 
negotiated since then have implied that RoO are front and centre in the negotiating 
agenda of the majority of WTO members. The EU in particular made substantial 
changes to its RoO model starting in the early 2000s. First, it progressively abandoned 
the “straight jacket” model that it imposed on itself as a result of its Pan-European 
RoO that were adopted in the early 1990s. According to the Pan European RoO 
model each EU PTA partner had to adopt an almost identical set of rules of origin 
set by the EU including the PSROs to allow cumulation among different PTAs and 
avoid a proliferation of divergent RoO across PTAs (Bombarda and Gamberoni, 
2013). While strictly adhered to for more than a decade, this approach was revealed 
to be excessively rigid when EU was negotiating with large trading partners because 
it did not allow concessions to be made on PSROs. Second, the EU undertook a 
sweeping and unprecedented reform of unilateral RoO, especially for the LDCs. 
While limited to developing countries, this reform provides a potential base on 
which to build in further reforms of EU RoO.  
The developments in preferential RoO in PTAs have led to some simplification 
and streamlining of the RoO, informed by lessons learned over more 20 years of 
operation of major PTAs. Progressively, the EU and the US, as well as counterpart 
OECD nations (e.g., Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand) have abandoned 
methodologies based on calculations of value added in favour of a value of materials 
used ad valorem percentage calculation. Some innovations have also been introduced, 
such as the deduction of cost of freight and insurance in recent US PTAs and in the 
TPP. There are, of course, differences in the arithmetical calculations and definitions 
of what goes into the numerator and denominator, but there is convergence towards 
determining ad valorem percentages based on a value of materials calculation rather 
than a value added or net cost approach, as used in NAFTA for automotive products. 
This tendency is confirmed by the evolution of the use of the net cost method in 
US PTAs that has been gradually introduced in subsequent agreements, and the 
introduction of the build-up and build-down method that has replaced the transaction 
value used in NAFTA – see Table 1. 
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Table 1. Evolution of the NAFTA Percentage-calculation Based RoO 
Regional value 
content criterion 
NAFTA CHL-USA CAFTA US-SIN US-AUS US-KOR TPP 
No. of PSRO  
of which: 
1,125 1,043 1,017 2,974 965 758 1,245 
Net cost  323 0 6 0 0 6 22 
Transaction 248 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Build-up 0 164 146 239 148 147 398 
Build-down 0 157 147 213 144 152 457 
Source: Own calculations. 
Note: PRSO: product-specific RoO. 
 
Thus, developments regarding preferential RoO in the PTAs that include the 
major players are pointing towards simplification and streamlining. This has supported 
greater trade as shown by the relatively high utilisation rate of major PTAs, which 
range from 80 percent to 90 percent (Swedish Board of Trade and UNCTAD, 2017). 
In a nutshell, there has been a lot of work on RoO that has had a pay-off. This 
complements reforms of RoO that apply to unilateral tariff preferences offered to 
LDCs. Such reforms were implemented by Canada in 2003 and by the EU for its 
“Everything But Arms” (EBA) duty-free, quota-free access program for LDCs, 
with the EBA rules of origin most recently redefined in 2011. More recently Japan 
also took the initiative to liberalize the RoO for LDCs for knitted and crocheted 
garments of HS chapter 61. These initiatives have contributed to the debate over 
simplification and relaxation of preferential RoO, brought new life to the discussions 
in the CRO and helped underpin two WTO Ministerial Decisions on preferential 
RoO for LDCs, illustrating that progress can be made at the multilateral level. The 
challenge now is to build on this progress to resume work at the multilateral level 
on non-preferential RoO.  
 
IV. ASSESSING DIFFERENCES IN RoO:  
A CONVERGENCE TREND? 
 
The lack of progress and meaningful discussions on RoO at the multilateral level 
since 2007 contrasts with the gradual movement towards de facto and de jure 
convergence across both preferential and non-preferential RoO in major jurisdictions. 
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Divergence certainly continues to exist for some sectors, but it is important to 
recognize that the situation “on the ground” has been changing. This suggests that 
multilateral discussions can build on this and focus on the reasons for continued 
divergence in specific sectors. In pursuing reforms and to better understand RoO 
regimes it is necessary to distinguish between the policy-objectives that underpin 
a given set of RoO (the “substance”) from the specific criteria used and how they 
are administered, i.e., the “format” of a RoO. The substantive dimension of a RoO 
is the degree of restrictiveness related to the value chain it impacts on. It is the 
substance that matters. If countries have common objectives as to what RoO are 
supposed to do, it is much more straightforward to achieve convergence, since the 
form a RoO takes is mostly a matter of drafting methodology. 
Although blocked for almost a decade at the time of writing, the mandate of the 
CRO to pursue harmonization of RoO provides a continuing opportunity to revitalize 
multilateral discussion on RoO at the WTO by drawing on and building on PTA 
experiences as well as unilateral reforms. Making progress in the CRO – or for that 
matter in developing the RoO associated with new PTAs – can be facilitated by a 
better understanding of how different RoO have evolved and the extent to which 
they are different. A challenge in assessing this is to compare different RoO for a 
given product. Such comparisons need to be undertaken at the 6-digit level of the 
HS classification (i.e., the subheading level). This spans over 6,000 categories. 
Ideally, one would concord different sets of RoO to each other at the product level 
and automate the codification of PRSO using algorithms to classify different RoO 
into “types.” This is a major challenge given the variations in formats and textual 
language used to define PRSO in different PTAs and non-reciprocal preferential 
trade arrangements. 
Economic analysis has sought to classify RoO by type and assess their relative 
restrictiveness on an ex ante basis using a mix of judgment and econometric estimation. 
Estevadeordal (1999) pioneered such analysis, focusing on NAFTA RoO.13 In this 
type of approach, each rule or set of rules is codified depending on the type of 
criterion used to define RoO at the product level and a qualitatively ordered index 
is constructed based on a set of assumptions regarding the relative restrictiveness 
of alternative types of RoO – e.g., changes of tariff classification at different HS 
 
13 See also Estevadeordal and Suominen (2006; 2008). 
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levels of disaggregation. While a useful approach to quantify the potential effects 
of different RoO, it is not very helpful if the goal is assess the degree of similarity 
of different RoO for a given product. The key challenge here is to characterize and 
“map” different approaches and requirements into common and comparable categories 
at a useful level of disaggregation. If the classification is designed at too broad a 
level, limiting the coding to the main principles used to define origin, there is little 
value added since this will result in different sets of RoO being compared or lumped 
together on the basis of oversimplified assumptions that do not reflect the complexity 
and diversity of RoO. On the other hand, if the taxonomy is designed in a very 
detailed manner, the task of codification becomes very difficult to operationalize 
in a way that is useful. 
In practice any effort to characterize the similarity of different criteria and 
approaches to determine origin must include some element of expertise and thus 
subjective judgement. Crivelli and Inama (2017) undertake a detailed comparison 
between the HRO and a selection of recent PTAs. They do this at the HS sub- 
heading level (there are 6366 sub-headings in the HS classification), focusing on 
the applicable PSRO with the aim of identifying instances of convergence, partial 
convergence or divergence among: (i) the results of the HWP process as last updated 
(the draft HRO); (ii) the TPP and the US-Korea agreement as examples of the 
NAFTA model of RoO that are mainly based on CTC and regional value content 
criteria; and (iii) the CETA – the first instance of the European and North American 
models coming to confront each other – and the EU-South Korea trade agreement. 
In order to draw such a comparison a taxonomy is developed to compare each of 
the PSRO contained in the abovementioned PTAs, using the following categories: 
(a) totally or partially convergent; and (b) divergent. The first category is sub-
divided into three groups: (i) all rules of origin (the four PTAs and the HWP) are 
identical or similar in terms of stringency and drafting form; (ii) the majority of 
the RoO are identical or similar in terms of stringency and drafting form; and (iii) 
the RoO are identical or similar in terms of stringency but have a different drafting 
form. Divergence occurs if there is a difference in terms of stringency and drafting 
form, distinguishing between instances where the RoO are either more or less stringent 
than the equivalent HRO provisions. 
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Total QUAD imports 
from the world 
 (US$ million) 
1 Totally convergent 135 2% 1,52 641,546 
2 Partially convergent 1’287 20% 2,76 2298,623 
3 
Partially convergent in stringency;  
different form of drafting 
1’994 31% 3,15 1648,448 
4 
Divergent, more stringent compared 
with HRO (HWP) draft rules 
823 13% 5,49 960,754 
5 
Divergent, but less stringent than 
HRO (HWP) draft rules 
2‘127 33% 6,00 1,321,871 
Total   6‘366 100%   
Source: Crivelli and Inama (2017). 
 
Crivelli and Inama (2017) show that governments have been able to make progress 
at product specific level in adopting RoO that are similar. Their comparisons of 
the draft HRO that came out of the WTO Harmonization Work Programme (HWP) 
for non-preferential origin rules with the RoO in these recent PTAs suggests there 
has been progress in simplification and convergence at sectoral level, despite the 
unwillingness of some governments to embrace the full HRO package. They find 
there is evidence of movement towards convergence and simplification of RoO: 
53% of all tariff lines at six digit level show a degree of convergence (Table 2). If 
tariff lines where the PRSO in the covered PTAs differ from the HRO but are more 
liberal are added to this (33% of the total), some 85% of the PSRO taken together 
are ether convergent and/or liberal. These are preliminary results that need to be 
further refined and validated. Moreover, it should be recognized that this type of 
analysis is partial as the focus is only on PRSO and ignores other dimensions of 
RoO regimes such as cumulation or the level of de minimis thresholds. That said, 
their findings reveal that: 
 
▪ There are sectors where there is significant convergence for some product 
categories – e.g., chemicals (helping to explain why this was one of the sectors 
where there was an early harvest in the TTIP negotiations);  
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▪ Differences often relate more to “form” than substance – i.e. the way in which 
the RoO are drafted frequently differ across PTAs but this need not imply 
major differences in the degree of stringency of the RoO; and 
▪ For some sensitive sectors, e.g., clothing and fisheries, there is substantial 
divergence in RoO. 
 
The extent to which the PRSO are convergent/divergent is illustrated further in 
Tables 3 and 4. These tables provide examples of cases of convergence for some 
sectors, as well as continued areas of divergence. Since Asian countries have largely 
adopted the North American model in setting their product specific rules of origin 
the results of this research may be particularly relevant since the starting point shows 
already a certain degree of convergence on the adoption of a model based on similar 
calculation of ad valorem percentage and use of change of tariff classification criteria. 
The boldface text in Table 3 shows where there is significant convergence or 
equivalence among the agreements. To some extent recent progress towards convergence 
between preferential and non-preferential RoO and more generally simplification 
of RoO has been facilitated by the removal of MFN tariffs for products – e.g., 
because of the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) and analogous zero-for-
zero sectoral agreements for chemical products. However, there are also other 
sectors with positive MFN duties where convergence has been occurring. What is 
needed now is further research to validate the initial findings and narrow down the 
results and most of all a political momentum to trigger the change. The results 
presented here suggest that there is value in seeking to identify emerging “best 
practices” for sectors where there is convergence and to identify sectors where 
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Hydrides, nitrides, azides, silicides and borides, whether or not chemically defined, 
other than compounds which are also carbides of heading 28.49. 
HRO CTH 
CETA 
A change from any other subheading, or: 
A change from within any one of these subheadings, whether or not there is also a 
change from any other subheading, provided that the value of non-originating 
materials classified in the same subheading as the final product does not exceed 20 
per cent of the transaction value or ex-works price of the product. 
TPP A change to a good of heading 28.50 from any other heading. 
EU_KOR 
Manufacture from materials of any heading, except that of the product. 
However, materials of the same heading as the product may be used, provided that 
their total value does not exceed 20% of the ex-works price of the product 





Bicycles and other cycles (including delivery tricycles), not motorized 
HRO CTH, except from heading 87.14; or 35% value added rule 
CETA 
A change from any other heading, except from 87.14; or 
A change from heading 87.14, whether or not there is also a change from any other 
heading, provided that the value of non-originating materials of heading 87.14 does 
not exceed 50% of the transaction value or ex- works price of the product 
TPP 
A change to a good of heading 87.12 from any other heading, except from 
heading 87.14; or 
No change in tariff classification required for a good of heading 87.12, provided 
there is a regional value content of not less than: 
a) 35% under the build-up method; or 
b) 45% under the build-down method; or 
60 per cent under the focused value method taking into account only the non- 
originating materials of heading 87.12 and 87.14 
EU_KOR 
Manufacture in which the value of all the materials used does not exceed 45% of the 
ex-works price of the product 
US-KOR 
A change to heading 87.12 through 87.13 from any other heading, except from 
heading 87.14; or, provided that there is a regional value content of not less than:  
(a) 35 percent under the build-up method, or (b) 45 percent under the build-down method.  
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Prepared or preserved fish; caviar and caviar substitutes prepared from fish eggs. 
HRO CTH 
CETA A change from any other chapter, except from Chapter 3 
TPP A change to a good of heading 16.05 from any other chapter. 
EU_KOR 
Manufacture: 
- for animals of Chapter 1, and/or 
- in which all the materia1s of Chapter 3 used are wholly obtained 





Men’s Cotton Pants 
HRO 
Change to goods of this split chapter provided that the goods are assembled in a 
single country in accordance with Chapter Note. 
CETA 
Weaving accompanied by making up (including cutting); or 
Making up preceded by printing accompanied by at least two preparatory or finishing 
operations (such as scouring, bleaching, mercerising, heat setting, raising, calendaring, 
shrink resistance processing, permanent finishing, decatising, impregnating, mending 
and hurling), provided that the value of the unprinted fabric used does not exceed 47.5 
per cent of the transaction value or ex-works price of the product. 
TPP 
A change to a good of heading 62.01 through 62.08 from any other chapter, except 
from heading 51.06 through 51.13,  
52.04 through 52.12 or 
54.01 through 54.02, subheading 5403.33 through 5403.39 or 
5403.42 through 5403.49, or 
heading 54.04 through 54.08, 55.08 through 55.16, 58.01 through 58.02 or 
60.01 through 60.06, provided the good is cut or knit to shape, or both, and sewn or 
otherwise assembled in the territory of one or more of the Parties. 
EU_KOR 
Weaving accompanied by making-up (including cutting) or 
Embroidering accompanied by making up (including cutting), provided that the value of the 
unembroidered fabric used does not exceed 40 % of the ex-works price of the product or 
Coating accompanied by making up (including cutting), provided that the value of the 
uncoated fabric used does not exceed 40% of the ex works price of the product or 
Making-up preceded by printing accompanied by at least two preparatory finishing 
operations (such as scouring, bleaching, mercerising, heat setting, raising, 
calendaring, shrink resistance processing, permanent finishing, decatising, 
impregnating, mending and hurling), provided that the value of the unprinted fabric 
used does not exceed 47.5% of the ex-works price of the product 
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Table 4. Continued 
Example 2 
US-KOR 
A change to subheading 6203.41 through 6203.49 from any other 4-20 chapter, except 
from heading 51.06 through 51.13, 52.04 through 52.12, 53.07 through 53.08, or 
53.10 through 53.11, 54.01 through 54.02, 
subheading 5403.33 through 5403.39, 5403.42 through heading 54.08, or 
heading 55.08 through 55.16, 58.01 through 58.02, or 
60.01 through 60.06, provided that the good is both cut and sewn or 
otherwise assembled in the territory of one or both of the Parties. 
 
 
V. MOVING FORWARD: PLURILATERAL COOPERATION ON 
RoO UNDER WTO AUSPICES? 
 
The experience with the HWP makes clear that a top down effort to harmonize 
nonpreferential RoO is very difficult, largely because of concerns by some countries 
that this will constrain their policy space. At the same time, it is important to recognize 
that at the technical level substantial progress was made on defining a set of harmonized 
RoO in the HWP. Moreover, “bottom up,” à la carte convergence is happening in 
significant segments of the preferential RoO landscape, as reflected in the RoO 
that are incorporated into recent PTAs and the progress that has been made in 
simplification of RoO for LDCs as part of duty-free, quota-free market access programs. 
This suggests that there is scope for proponents of simplification and harmonization 
of RoO to leverage the outcome of the HWP and the trend towards convergence of 
PSROs in PTAs through cooperation between subsets of interested countries. 
Cooperation on trade policy matters in the WTO generally has been driven by 
small-groups of countries with an interest is an issue. In this regard there is a similarity 
between PTAs – which are by definition initiatives that span only a limited number 
of countries – and the WTO, the major difference of course being that small group 
initiatives in the WTO are aimed at multilateral cooperation that spans all WTO 
members. However, this need not be the case – WTO members may conclude 
agreements among subsets of countries under the umbrella of the WTO that do not 
take the form of PTAs. There are two main mechanisms in the WTO for countries 
to form a “club” on an issue-specific agenda of common interest: conclusion of a 
Plurilateral Agreement (PA) under Article II.3 WTO, and so-called critical mass 
agreements (CMAs). CMAs are agreements in which negotiated disciplines apply 
22 Bernard Hoekman and Stefano Inama 
ⓒ Korea Institute for International Economic Policy 
to only a subset of countries, but benefits are extended on a nondiscriminatory 
(MFN) basis. Examples of CMAs include initiatives such as the Information 
Technology Agreement (ITA) and other so-called “zero-for-zero” agreements in 
which a group of countries agree to eliminate tariffs for a specific set of products. 
CMAs are not limited to goods. They have also been negotiated for specific services 
sectors. Examples are the Agreement on Basic Telecommunications and the Agreement 
on Financial Services, both concluded under the auspices of the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS) (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009). 
PAs differ from CMAs in that they may be applied on a discriminatory basis – 
that is, benefits need not be extended to non-signatories. There are currently two PAs 
incorporated into the WTO: the Agreement on Civil Aircraft and the Agreement 
on Government Procurement. Because PAs may be applied on a discriminatory 
basis, their incorporation into the WTO requires unanimity – all WTO members 
must agree that a subset of countries implement a PA. The constraint that PAs be 
adopted “exclusively by consensus”14 is a major hurdle to overcome, and explains 
why there are only two PAs, both of which were negotiated during the GATT years, 
long before the WTO entered into force. The rationale for the consensus rule is that 
it ensures that nonparticipants cannot be confronted with PAs that may negatively 
affect them even if they do not join them and, more generally, that all WTO members 
have a say on the salience and appropriateness of a given policy area being administered 
by the WTO secretariat (Lawrence, 2006). 
Hoekman and Mavroidis (2015a; 2015b; 2017) discuss the modalities of club-
based initiatives in the WTO. There are good reasons for attempting to do more via 
CMAs and PAs, given the increasing difficulty of concluding multilateral agreements 
– exemplified by the failure of the Doha Development Agenda to reach a successful 
conclusion and the current deadlock in the WTO. CMAs and PAs cannot reduce 
the welfare of any country, including those that decide not to join, because CMAs 
apply on an MFN basis and PAs must be approved by the WTO Membership as a 
whole. CMAs and PAs are more transparent than PTAs as they involve formal 
scheduling of commitments by signatories and regular reporting on activities to the 
WTO Membership as a whole. They imply less dispersion in rules and approaches 
– and thus transactions costs and trade diversion – than PTAs. Indeed, they offer a 
 
14 See Article X.9 of the Agreement Establishing the WTO. 
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way to multilateralize elements of what may be covered in PTAs. Multiple PTAs 
dealing with the same subject matter often do so in ways that imply that the rules 
of the game for firms differ depending on the PTA that applies for a given trade 
flow. RoO are one of the most obvious examples of a policy area that can lead to 
this result. 
There is no formal constraint on the ability of a club of WTO Members to pursue 
CMAs that involve deepening of disciplines on policies that are already subject to 
WTO rules, as long as they are willing to apply these on an MFN basis (Hoekman 
and Mavroidis, 2017). Nonpreferential RoO must apply on a MFN basis, suggesting 
that plurilateral cooperation initiatives in this area will have to take the form of a 
CMA. What might a plurilateral initiative focus on? Recent submissions to the CRO 
such as the informal proposals that were made by Switzerland in 2016 on transparency 
and certification could be the basis of a plurilateral effort for a club of countries to 
agree to adopt a common set of RoO that are showing convergence. One straightforward 
way to proceed that is unlikely to confront significant political constraints would be 
to start with a focus on zero-rated MFN products and agree to implement harmonized 
nonpreferential RoO for such goods. Given zero MFN rates, it should also be 
feasible to agree to a single RoO for such products, i.e., apply the same RoO to 
goods from any source, including those originating in PTA partner countries. 
Transparency remains a serious problem for firms and other stakeholders – the 
type of exercise undertaken by Crivelli and Inama (2017) discussed briefly above 
could be used as a starting point to identify at product-specific level where such 
convergence has taken place. Such an exercise could be extended to encompass all 
major PTAs and preferential market access programs under the GSP. A collaborative 
effort among interested countries to do so will in any event be a necessary condition 
for identifying where RoO are already very similar and thus equivalent in terms of 
underlying regulatory objectives and criteria. Where RoO are equivalent, there is 
scope to formally agree to accept (“recognize”) the RoO applied by any of the 
participating members of the club. 
CMAs can also be envisaged for cooperation on the administration of RoO, i.e. 
processes related to the documentary evidence required to demonstrate compliance 
with RoO that is often quoted by business as the most exasperating aspect of RoO. 
This falls under the heading of “certification” and is an area where the multilateral 
trading system has been conspicously absent. At present Chapter 2 of Annex K of the 
revised Kyoto Convention 2000 is the only existing multilateral text on administration 
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and certification of rules of origin. The administrative dimensions of RoO mostly apply 
across all products – there are seldom product-specific administrative requirements. 
When there are, they mostly apply at broad category levels (an example is textiles 
and apparel in certain US PTAs). In practice there are only a limited number of 
ways of administering RoO. The most used methodologies are: (i) certificate of origin 
on paper issued by certifying authorities with use of stamps and/or signatures; (ii) 
certificate or statement of origin issued by the exporter (with or without registration 
with certifying authorities); and (iii) a statement of origin issued by the importer. 
Overreliance by some customs administrations on out-dated forms of administering 
RoO based on documentary evidence – e.g., a certificate of origin, the exchange of 
seals and signatures of certifying officers, or non-manipulation certificates issued 
in the country of transit – can make administration of RoO into a non-tariff barrier. 
Shifting to a Customs-authorised exporter declaration of origin with retroactive 
checks and post-clearance recovery offers one model for reducing RoO-related 
administrative costs. The 2017 reform of the EU’s RoO for its GSP regime provides 
for listing registered exporters in a database administered by national customs 
agencies. Registered exporters will be given a number and may issue a declaration 
of origin. When this self-declaration is presented at an EU port of entry, customs 
will consult the joint database to ascertain whether the exporter has been registered 
and, if so, will grant preferential tariff rates. Verification of an exporter’s declaration 
and post-clearance recovery are part of this administrative method. This is an example 
of a reform in the administration of RoO that may facilitate trade. There are other 
options as well, such as the method employed by US Customs and Border Protection, 
which is based on importer declarations and disregards evidence provided by exporters 
or certificates of origin issued by third parties. Whatever method is used, reliance 
on certificates of origin and the exchange of seals and signatures should be a thing 
of the past. A CMA on certification among a set of countries interested in adopting 
a common approach to reducing the costs of administering RoO would reduce the 
heterogeneity of RoO regimes confronting international business. 
The level of ambition for plurilateral initiatives will depend on the specific interests 
and objectives of participating countries. For example, single transformation is arguably 
a good rule of thumb for drafting RoO in a world characterized by global value 
chain-based production. Given that this type of production involves firms specializing 
in specific tasks or activities, RoO that entail a need for more extensive value addition 
or transformation will undercut the ability of countries to engage in this type of 
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production and trade unless they are part of larger regional integration arrangements 
that permit cumulation for RoO purposes. This is not the case for many developing 
nations and the design of RoO therefore should reflect this reality. Traditional 
protectionist double or triple transformation requirements greatly impede participation 
in value chains. While it may be difficult to abolish such RoO for “sensitive sectors” 
– e.g., textiles and clothing for the US, certain processed agricultural products in 
the EU and Japan – progress on this front has proved possible in the context of 
implementing DFQF market access programs for LDCs and for many products PTAs 
have been moving to greater use of single transformation-based RoO criteria. 
Sceptics may argue that such a simple rule of thumb is unthinkable but the evidence 
from recent PTAs and developments in the administration of nonreciprocal preferences 
schemes suggests that efforts to bring together the relevant actors (firms, Customs 
and trade officials) can allow reforms to be agreed and implemented. Here again a 
plurilateral process could form the basis for such deliberations and help to define 
the potential substance of a CMA. 
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
The nature of RoO – a rather technical and complex subject – is not one that 
attracts the interest of most trade policy officials and Ministers. Yet these same actors 
are prone to use RoO when convenient or expeditious to respond to protectionist 
lobbies. Business has been ambivalent on the issue of RoO. On the one hand they 
often complain about the complexity of RoO but on the other hand they do not 
push Governments to make the extra effort required to seek a multilateral solution. 
The focus instead has been on “easy fixes” in the context of PTAs, which are seen 
as more feasible and less costly than focusing on making progress under the WTO 
umbrella. An emphasis on PTAs may also reflect the evolving nature of international 
(regional) trade, as exemplified by the rising intensity of regional value or supply 
chains – which has led businesses to push negotiators and governments to simplify 
the RoO that apply in PTAs. 
Two of the largest trade powers, the EU and US, have made some progress 
towards simplification of RoO in their PTAs and preferential access programs for 
developing countries. There have been positive spillovers for trade integration 
agreements, including in the Asia-Pacific region (e.g., the TPP). The issue at stake 
for the global trading system is how to leverage these various positive developments 
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and to cross fertilize (multilateralize) the simplifications and partial convergence 
in RoO that is reflected in recent PTAs. One path to do so is to break the wall that 
has separated preferential and nonpreferential RoO. In a number of sectors (e.g., 
chemicals) bridges spanning the preferential and nonpreferential RoO divide have 
already been built.  
Discussions in the WTO CRO aimed at greater harmonization and simplification 
of nonpreferential RoO have not been successful in generating an agreement to 
apply a set of common RoO. This should not preclude countries interested in pursuing 
these objectives from doing so in a concerted fashion through a plurilateral initiative 
on RoO. The WTO provides a framework for members to do so, and such initiatives 
have been pursued in the past to liberalize trade in specific types of goods or to 
agree on specific rules of the game for services sectors. At the 11th WTO Ministerial 
conference in Buenos Aires at the end of 2017 groups of countries agreed to explore 
the possibility of plurilateral cooperation in areas such as e-commerce, suggesting 
an interest and willingness to pursue cooperation on a plurilateral basis. The end result 
may be new CMAs. 
One area that would appear to lend itself well to such plurilateral cooperation are 
RoO, in part because of the nascent trends towards greater convergence in RoO 
observed in recent PTAs for some types of products and sectors. A necessary condition 
for determining where such cooperation is feasible and could be pursued is analysis 
of the type undertaken by Crivelli and Inama (2017). Further development and use 
of the taxonomies proposed in that paper to measure convergence in PRSO would 
help to identify where simplification and convergence has been taking place and thus 
where it may be possible to agree, on a plurilateral basis, that RoO are equivalent, 
thereby facilitating trade by lowering costs for international businesses and traders 
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